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Countries cooperate  in negotiating treaties.  However, treaty compliance
is noncooperative;  signatories comply with treaties  only if compliance  leaves
them better off than noncompliance.  US  and EC agricultural policies  of 1986
are modeled through a noncooperative game.  Bilateral treaties,
formalizations of Nash Equilibria, are presented which improve US and EC
welfare.In 1987  the  Reagan administration proposed the complete liberalization of
trade  in agricultural commodities  in  ten years at the  General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade  (GATT) negotiations  in Geneva, Switzerland.  This proposal
encountered great resistance  from many countries,  most notably the countries
of the  European Community  (EC).  Despite  this resistance, the  EC and others
admitted that current agricultural policies were too expensive and
destabilized  world markets in agricultural products, but the  disparate
proposals offered by each negotiating block, the United States  (US),  the  EC,
the Cairns group, and the  Nordic countries,  indicated that much compromise was
necessary before any agreement could be  reached (National Center) and a treaty
signed.
Because  the signatories  of treaties are sovereign states none can be
compelled to  sign a treaty or comply with it after  it  is  signed.  Compliance
depends  on whether countries are made better off with the  treaty than without
it,  thus noncooperative game theory is an  ideal tool  to  evaluate treaties.
Using three noncooperative games between the US and the  EC based on an
empirical trade model by Mahe and Tavera, this paper explores two kinds of
treaties. One  assumes  the treaty enables  the US and the  EC simultaneously to
introduce  a new policy instrument which political powers at home would
otherwise exclude.  The second treaty formalizes Nash equilibrium strategies
in an infinitely  repeated game.  In both cases  the US and the  EC  are better
off when complying with the treaty.
Many authors have applied game theory to world grain markets, for example
Sarris  and Freebairn, Karp and McCalla, and Paarlberg and Abbot.  They assume
governments have preferences over domestic groups  in the market and play a
noncooperative game choosing policies to maximize  their preferences  taking the
policies of other governments as  given.  This defines a Nash (or Cournot-Nash)
equilibrium for the  game.  The equilibrium implicitly determines world prices,price stability, and trade  flows.  The following games use Nash equilibrium as
a solution concept.
Game One
The  action spaces  of each player, the US and the  EC,  contain four policy
alternatives.  Option 0 is  the status quo, what was  observed in 1986.  Option
1 changes policy  in  grains and feed.  Option 2 contains option 1 and policy
changes  in beef and dairy.  Option 3 contains option 2 and policy changes  in
sugar.  As  a rule,  the policy changes reflect greater and greater
liberalization in agricultural trade.  See Mahe and Tavera (p. 10)  for a more
explicit description of  these four policies.  Player  i's action space,  i - us,
ec,  is defined as
A. =  (0,  1, 2, 3).
1
Let a. be a generic element of A. and  the Cartesian product of the  two  action
1  1
spaces, A =  A  xA  ,  be  the action space for the  game.  For  simplicity adopt us  ec
the convention that  -i denotes  the other player.
Each government  considers  three constituencies when formulating policy:
producers, consumers,  and all others.  The welfare of producers  is measured by
their value added  (P).  The consumers' welfare  is measured through consumer
surplus  (C).  The welfare of all others is  given by the surplus  or deficit of
the  agricultural budget  (B).  P, C, and B are functions of A.  Of course
governments must be able to compare  the welfares of each constituency to
decide which policy option is best.  Thus let each government have an additive
social welfare function.
(1) V.(A) =  WciCi(A)  + WbiBi(A) +  W  .P.(A);  i - us,  ec;
where W..  >  0, j =  c, b, p.  Since we  are only  interested in the  ordinal
Ji
properties  of this  function and since the  function is additive, we normalize
V.  setting V.(0,0)  to zero and W  . to  one.  Mahe and Tavera  (p. 20)  provide
explicit values for C.(A),  B.(A),  and P.(A).
1  1  1To define a Nash equilibrium for this game, ai,  i =  us,  ec,  is  a best
response to a  if V.(a.,  a .)  >  V.(a.,  a .)  for all a. in A ..  A pair,
-*  *  1  1  -1  1  '  1  - *  1  *
(aus  ae),  is  a Nash equilibrium if a  (resp. a  ) is  best response to  a us e  us  ec  ec
(resp. a  ). us
Although players  are maximizers  in playing Nash equilibrium strategies,
those  actions  are not  always optimal.  The  "prisoner's dilemma"  is  the most
conspicuous  example  of this.  Furthermore  games may have multiple Nash
equilibria.  Under suitable conditions  treaties  can solve these problems by
formalizing and coordinating alternative Nash equilibrium strategies which
induce  strictly Pareto superior outcomes.  Games Two and Three are examples of
this when compared to Game One.  Game One  rationalizes the status quo of 1986
in  that  it uses welfare weights which induce  the action pair,  (0, 0),  as  a
Nash equilibrium.
Not every pair of welfare weights,  (Wbi, W  .),  i  - us,  ec,  leads  to  (0,0)
as  a Nash equilibrium.  It  is  necessary and sufficient  that the welfare weight
pair  for  the US be an element of the  set,
(2)  W  =  ((W  W  )  R2  W  <  .781, and W  5  1.693  - 1.345W  ), us  bus  cus  +'  bus  cus  bus
and that the welfare weight pair  (Wbec  W  ) be an element of the  set,
bec  cec
(3)  W  =  ((W  ,  W  )  R2  and (W  <  .86  - .963W ec  bec'  cec  +  cec  bec
To  show necessity, suppose  (W  busW  ) and (Wbec  W  ) induce
bus  cus  bec  cec
(0,0) as  a Nash equilibrium.  Then by definition the US plays option 0 as a
best response  to the  EC playing 0.  By definition of best response,
V  (0,0)  _  V  (k,  0);  k =  1, 2, 3.
Using (1) and substituting for  the values of Bus  C  ,  and P  found in Mahe 0 us  US  US
and Tavera  (p. 20),  for k =  1, 2, 3,
0  >  4.74W  +  OW  - 3.70, bus  cus
0 >  6.44W  +  3.90W  - 7.62, and bus  cus
0  >  6.79W  +  5.05W  - 8.55. bus  cusSimplifying one obtains
Wbus  .781,
bus  -
W  5  1.954  - 1.651W  and
cus  bus'
W  s  1.693  - 1.345W cus  bus
These  inequalities must hold simultaneously if 0 is a best response.  The  area
identified by the  third inequality lies  inside  that of  the second when Wbu s is bus
less  than  .781;  its  line has steeper  slope and intersects Wbu s   .781 at a
greater W  than the  line boundary of the third inequality.  Furthermore CUS
(W  W  )  is nonnegative by assumption of V..  Consequently these three bus  cus  I
equations and nonnegativity reduce to  (2);  necessity  is  shown for W
us
Similarly, the  EC's best response  to  the US  playing option 0 must also be
option 0.  By definition of a best response,
V  (0, 0) >  V  (k, 0),  k - 1, 2, 3. ec  ec
Using  (1) and the values  of Bec  C,  and P  in Mahe and Tavera  (p. 20), ec  '  ec'  ec
rewrite  the  inequalities as
0 >  2.89Wb   + 3.00W  - 2.58, bec  cec
0 >  10.01W  +  10.84W  - 16.11, and bec  cec
0 >  10.24W  +  13.08W  - 18.18.
bec  cec
Simplifying,
W  <  .86  - .963W
cec  bec'
W  <  1.486  - .923W  ,  and
cec  bec'
W  _  1.39  - .783W cec  bec
The  set of points  identified by the  first equation lies  completely
within the  sets  identified by the  second two when W  and W  are
bec  cec
nonnegative.  Thus  the three  inequalities  and nonnegativity reduce to  (3);
necessity is  shown for W
ec
To  show sufficiency, suppose not.  Then there are pairs,  (Wb, Wcus)
bus  CUS
and  (Wbec  W  )  which induces  (0, 0)  as  a Nash equilibrium, but  (W  bu s W  ) bec'  cec  bus,  CUSis  not in W  or  (Wb,  W  )  is not  in W  . This implies  that nonnegativity us  bec  cec  ec
or  an inequality of W  or W  is violated.  Nonnegativity must hold by
US  ec
assumption of V..  Therefore an inequality of W  or W  must be violated.
I  us  ec
But if  it  is  violated then so  is  a best response condition for the US  or the
EC,  since the  inequality and nonnegativity are equivalent to a best response
condition by construction above,  so option 0 is  not a best response.  This
contradicts  that  (0,  0) is  induced as  a Nash equilibrium.  Sufficiency is
shown.
Game One uses welfare weights which induce  (0,  0) as a Nash Equilibrium.
It  is  summarized by the  following payoff matrix.
Table One:  Game One Payoff Matrix, (Vus, Ve us  ec
Player  EC
US
Option  0  1  2  3
0  0.00,  0.00  0.08,  -0.05  -0.23,  -7.14  -0.24,  -8.15
1  0.00,  0.07  0.01,  0.06  -0.25,  -7.05  -0.24  -8.06
2  -2.59,  0.27  -2.84,  0.46  -2.55,  -6.93  -2.54,  -7.94
3  -3.25,  0.28  -3.50,  0.48  -3.18,  -6.91  -3.24,  -7.92
W  =  W  - 0.43;  W  - .781, W  =0 bec  cec  bus  cus
Game One has  two Nash equilibria,  (0, 0) which we observe and (0, 1).
(0, 0) is  a Nash equilibrium by construction of the  game.  The Nash
equilibrium concept only requires  that either  (1, 0) or  (0, 0) be played;  it
does not predict which will be played.
Game Two
An interesting feature  of Game One  is  that an action pair exists  (1, 1)
which if played would improve the payoffs for the US  and the  EC.
Nevertheless  in this game  (1, 1) cannot be sustained, since the  EC's best
response to option  1 of the US  is  to play option 0 and the US' best responseto option 1 of  the EC  is  to play option 0.  But consider an extension of this
game.  The US  and the  EC repeat  the game every year choosing an action from
the  same  action space and receiving payoffs exactly as  before.  Game Two  is
an infinite  repetition of Game One.  (See MacMillan for an introduction to
infinitely  repeated games.)
To  define the  action space for the US  and the  EC in an infinitely
repeated game,  at any time  t the US and the  EC choose actions from A  and A
US  ec
defined in Game One.  Relabel  these spaces A  and A  t =  1, 2, 3,  ... ,  so
ust  ect'
A  =  A  x A  . By extension the action space of the  infinitely repeated t  ust  ect
game  is  the  infinite  Cartesian product, A - Al x A 2  ***.  An element of A  is
a =  (a  ,  a  ), a. =  (ail, ai2,  ai3  ...), an infinite  sequence containing any
combinations of 0's,  l's,  2's,  or  3's.  a. is  called an action profile.  The
1
payoff for i from a. given a . is
dt  V i
Vi(ai'  ai)  =  Vit(ait,  ait);  i =  us,  ec;
1  1  -1  t=l  i  it  it  -it
where  t denotes  the  time period, where V.  is  the  social welfare function of
it
th
Game One, where ait  (resp. a . ) is  the  action taken by the  i  player  (resp.
th
-i  player)  at time  t, where d,  O < d. < 1, is  player  i's discount rate,
1  1
and where a. and a . are action profiles.  The definition of a Nash
1  -1
equilibrium for  the  infinitely repeated game extends from the one-shot game by
substituting action profiles  for single  actions and the present value  function
for  the  one period social welfare function.
At time  t, a history a  is  a sequence  of actions by the  US and the EC to
t
time  t-1;  at  =  (al'  a2,  ... "  at-1).  For player  i, a  strategy profile  s. is
an  infinite sequence  of functions which takes  any possible history a  into an
1  2
action a.  for all  t;  s. - (s.  (a ),  s.  (a ), ... ).  Simple strategy profiles
can be  abbreviated into  short sentences, for example, "play option 3 in all
periods for  all histories."  Two  strategy profiles will induce  two actionprofiles.  Thus the present value for player i of si  given s i  is  the present
value  arising from the  induced action profiles.  A Nash equilibrium in
strategy profiles requires, however, not only that  the  induced action profiles
be best responses  to  each other but also that the  off-equilibrium paths be
best responses.  The meaning of  the second condition will be clearer when the
following treaty is  analyzed.
Suppose  that  the  EC possesses a discount rate, dec  such that d  >_ 1/7 ec'  ec
and  that the US possesses  a discount rate,  dus,  such that dus  7/8.  Then a
treaty containing the  following strategy profiles,  si,  is  a Nash equilibrium
and  induces the  action profiles, a. =  (1, 1, 1,  ... )  for  i =  us, ec,  where
play 1 at t  =  1;
s  =  play 1,  if  for all  j  <  t,  t  >  1, ai  =  1;
play 0, otherwise.
(The restrictions  on d. reflect necessary conditions  for treaty
compliance.  They do not  imply that d  must differ markedly from d  .)
s. has  two parts;  compliance, which is  play option 1 as  along as  the
other plays option 1, and retaliation, which is  play option 0 forever should
-i not comply.  Compliance  is  the equilibrium path, the sequence  of actions
which the US  and the  EC will actually play  (assuming that compliance  is a best
response).  Retaliation  is  the off-equilibrium path.  The action profiles
resulting from retaliation must also be best responses. Intuitively this
requires  that each country be willing to  retaliate according to  the  treaty
should the  other not comply with the treaty.
If a government chooses  to deviate from the  treaty, then  it knows  that
the  other government will play option 0 forever after.  Option 0  is  a best
response to  this.  The  action pair  (0, 0)  is a Nash equilibrium for any
single  period, so  an infinite  sequence of  (0, 0)'s  is  a Nash equilibrium for
the  infinitely repeated game.  If it were not  then a government at  some  timet could find an action better than option 0, but this  contradicts that  (0, 0)
is  a Nash equilibrium for Game One.  Therefore the action profiles  induced
through retaliation are a Nash equilibrium vector of action profiles.
To  show that compliance  is  a best response, at time  t =  1, country i
calculates  two present values:  the present value of playing option 1 forever,
eternal compliance, knowing  that -i will, in turn, also play option 1 forever,
and the  present value  of noncompliance by playing its best response  to  option
1, which is  option 0, and then playing option 0 forever after since -i will
retaliate with option 0.  Eternal compliance  is  a best response if and only if
its present value  is  at least  as  great as  the present value of noncompliance.
The present value of eternal compliance  for  the  EC is
Sl  de  V  (1,  1)  =  0   dt  (0.06) - 0.06d  /(l-d  ).
t=l  ec  ect'  t=l  ec  ec  ec
The present value of noncompliance  is
d  V  (1, 0) +  dt  V  (0, 0) = 0.07d ec  ecl  t=2  ec ect  ec
Combining these  results,  eternal compliance  is  a best response if  and only if
0.06d  /(l-d  ) 2  0.07  d  . Solving for  d  ,  d  >  1/7.  By  assumption d  >
e  c  ec  ecec  ec ec  ec
1/7,  so  eternal compliance  is  a best response  for  the EC.
For  the US  the  present value of eternal compliance is
Sd t  V  (1, 1) =(0.01)  - 0.Old  /(l-d  ). St=l  us  ust  (t=1  us  us  us
The present value of noncompliance  is
d  V  (1, 0) +  dt V  (0,  0) - 0.08d
us usl  t-2 us ust  us
Using  these results,  eternal compliance  is  a best response  if and only
if 0.Old  /(l  - d  )  >  0.08d  . Solving for d  ,  d  >  7/8.  By assumption
us  us  us  us  us
d  >  7/8,  so eternal compliance  is  a best response  for the US.  The best
us
responses of  the EC and the US  are to comply with the  treaty in playing option
1 and  if retaliation  is ever necessary to  play option 0.  Thus  the  treaty
represents a Nash equilibrium in strategy profiles, and since  (1, 1)  is  played
forever,  this  leads to  strictly higher payoffs for  the US  and the  EC.Game Three
Robert Paarlberg argues that governments  lose domestic support and hence
endanger their positions  in power when they appear  too willing to  compromise
at  treaty negotiations.  Domestic constituencies want hard bargainers.
However an alternative hypothesis is  also possible:  governments gather
domestic support for new policy instruments which would otherwise be
politically infeasible because  they can bring other governments to  accept the
same policy instruments through a treaty.  As a result a new action space is
defined and hence a new game.
The new game  is  a conjunction of Game One and what is  depicted below as
Game Three.  The conjoined game differs  fundamentally from Games One  and Two.
In Games One and Two, the  actions  taken by a government do not  affect the
action space of the  other government.  Each government always chooses  from
four possible actions.  In the new game both governments must sign the
treaty--both must agree  to play Game Three--in order to use  the new policy
instrument.  Because the  action space of one  is  constrained by the choice of
the other, the  new game  is  a generalized game.  Similarly the corresponding
solution concept is  a generalized Nash equilibrium.  This does not affect  the
noncooperative nature  of the game.  No government  is  compelled to comply with
the treaty.  It will be  apparent, however, that both will choose to  comply.
Consider Game Three.
Game Three  extends  the action space  of Game One.  The treaty enables  the
governments  to  introduce  transfer payments to producers.  The payments cannot
exceed the  amount of budget savings  resulting from the  introduction of the
various  options.  By inspection of the  sets  ((2)  and (3))  of Nash inducing
welfare weights on page  three, Wb s  and Wbe  are always less  than one. bus  becTherefore whichever Wbi  the governments might possess, they will always choose
to  transfer any budgetary savings  to  their producers.  Using this  fact,  the
payoff matrix of Game Three is  given in table  two.
Table  Two:  Payoff Matrix for Game Three
Player  EC
US
Option  0'  1'  2'  3'
0'  0.00,  0.00  0.46,  1.60  0.06,  -1.48  0.05,  -2.32
1'  1.04,  0.05  1.43, 1.66  1.06,  -1.37  1.09,  -2.24
2'  -1.18,  0.46  -1.07,  2.34  -0.92,  -1.31  -0.92,  -2.18
3'  -1.76.  0.48  -1.66,  2.37  -1.48,  -1.28  -1.55,  -2.17
W  b  = W  =  .43; W  =  .781, W  =  0
bec  cec  bus  cus
The  '  denotes  the addition of the  transfer  to  the respective option.
(1',  1')  is  the unique Nash equilibrium of Game Three.  It  induces payoffs
(1.43,  1.66).  For both governments option 1' is a best response to  any action
of the  other.  Reconsidering the  conjoined game of Game One and Game Three,
the Nash equilibria of Game One and the Nash equilibrium of Game Three are  the
Generalized Nash equilibria of the new game.  Through compliance with the
treaty, however, both governments  can improve their payoffs.
Concluding Remarks
This paper considers three  games based on data from 1986 for US and EC
agricultural policy in order to  discuss  the possible benefits  of treaties
governing agricultural  trade.  Game One presents a game which is  consistent
with the hypothesis  that observed policies  (the status  quo)  are Nash
equilibria of noncooperative games.  Game Two identifies a treaty which
formalizes Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of a repeated game.  The
strategy profiles  induce a Pareto improving outcome over  the  status quo.  Game
Three portrays  the consequences of a treaty which allows the US and the EC  tointroduce new policy instruments.  The  resulting Nash equilibrium  is a Pareto
improvement of  the status  quo.
The characterization of treaties  and current agricultural policies as
Nash equilibria imputes rationality to  the choices of governments;  they do
their best given  their options and the  decisions of others.  This behavior
does not always  lead to  the best solutions, witness Game One.  However in
treaty negotiations, governments  create a new game discovering treaties  which
improve upon the current situation.  Although Game Three  is  the better treaty
yielding higher payoffs  for both governments  for every period in this  paper,
other games may lead to  treaties with which all would comply but among which
no  treaty is  Pareto superior.  The problem of multiple Nash equilibria
reasserts itself at a higher level.  In this case a treaty may only be
selected within the political game  which each government plays at home.  R.
Paarlberg's hard bargainer may exist here.
Of course the  resolution of the  GATT negotiations on agricultural  trade
will reflect not only the  interests of the US and  the EC but also  the
interests of other participants.  Furthermore  the  simple games presented in
this paper  are only illustrations of what may motivate  treaty negotiations.  A
more realistic model  of US and EC behaviors will require more sophisticated
action spaces  and a more explicit representation of  the economic structure
which drives the model.  Through the  explicit use of  the economic  structure of
world agriculture one can consider how structural changes  in agriculture will
affect the  payoffs to  governments from alternative policy choices and hence
undermine or support treaty compliance  in dynamic and not repeated games.References
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